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PRIVATIZATION IN 
FORMER EAST GERMANY 
Lauren Bloomstein 
Introduction 
As a result of the ravages of Hitler, Stalin, 
and 30 years of isolation after the construction 
of the Berlin Wall, East Germany had been 
reduced to a virtual third-world nation in com-
parison with West Germany. (Borneman, pp. 8-
14) Despite their proximity, years of commu-
nist rule on one side and a free-market economy 
on the other created vast differences between 
the two: lifestyle, prosperity, demographics, 
productivity, resources and their utilization, 
mechanization, and opportunity. ("No Escape," 
pp . 6-7) High unemployment and increased 
taxes following reunification placed great strain 
on the German people. (Kinzer, p. A14) 
One of the factors contributing to the 
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was the con-
tinuing exodus from the East. As a conse-
quence of intolerable living conditions and 
attempts to collectivize the farmlands, 200,000 
East Germans fled in 1960, 54,000 more than 
in 1959. (McAdams, pp. 48-49) After an addi-
tional 30 years of isolation in a socialistic state, 
the East Germans had lost their ability to think 
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independently. The older ones were more will-
ing to accept authoritarian rule, since they 
lacked the ambition and ability to take risks. 
The East Germans were also "noticeably less 
worldly and sophisticated than West Germans ... 
more subdued .... " (Ardagh, 1987, pp. 338-39) 
Following reunification differences in outlook 
became more apparent. They were jealous of 
the Westerners' prosperity and did not under-
stand why more was not given to them. (Kinzer, 
p. A14) The younger ones migrated West in 
search of a better life. (Hall, p. 31) Their exo-
dus created higher unemployment and greater 
job competition in the West. In the long run, 
this may help hold down wages, thereby pre-
venting increases in manufacturing costs, and 
may result in more competitiveness in the 
international market. 
Had there not been a migration of younger 
people from East to West, the unemployment 
rate in the East would undoubtedly be higher. 
This migration has resulted in an increase in the 
proportion of elderly in the population of Eastern 
Germany, accompanied by a very low birth rate 
in the East. ("Germany's Mezzogiorno," p. 10) 
As the Eastern German population continues to 
age, a growing number will become even more 
dependent on the government. A smaller 
Eastern work force and higher unemployment 
in both the East and West have put a greater 
strain on the government. ("No Escape," p. 5) 
Higher unemployment has also resulted in more 
welfare recipients, with the final impact being 
higher taxes. (Kinzer, p. A14) 
The entire unification process is a unique 
occurrence. With the sudden global demise of 
communism, the former communist bloc 
nations have fallen into turmoil. As precipitous 
as it may have appeared to many, the seeds of 
destruction had been growing for a considerable 
time. Governments no longer were able to sub-
sidize insolvent industries, production had 
declined, products were substandard, equipment 
outmoded and in disrepair, and pollution was 
severe. As a result of inept management, com-
munist nations were no longer functional. With 
no government left to run the state-owned enter-
prises, new owners had to be found. Just as the 
communists had nationalized industry, now the 
reverse - privatization -was occurring. 
In this essay, I first explain privatization 
in a general sense. I then discuss Treuhand, the 
agency established to privatize the industry of 
the former East Germany- its characteristics, 
accomplishments, and the criticisms it has 
encountered. I conclude by emphasizing the 
success of Treuhand and its contribution not 
only to a strong unified Germany, but to the 
entire world. 
Privatization 
What is privatization? Simply put, priva-
tization is the process by which a state either 
wholly or partially divests itself of state-owned 
enterprises. New ownership may be any of the 
forms recognized in a market economy: indi-
vidual ownership, partnership, or corporate 
(stock) ownership. In addition, the state may 
wish to retain a partial interest. It may make 
sense to divide a large industry into smaller 
components, either to prevent monopolies or 
to simplify the privatization process. In the case 
of a totally unsalvageable industry, it may be 
necessary to shut the business down and dis-
pose of the assets, equipment, and physical 
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plant in the most expedient manner possible. 
("Treuhandanstalt: The Chance ... ," p. 9) 
Rationale for Privatization 
The major reason for privatizing is to 
reduce the cost of running government and to 
improve the quality of products and services, 
thereby enabling an economy to become more 
competitive and more prosperous. Privatiza-
tion also brings in additional funds which can 
aid in reducing an internal deficit or an exter-
nal debt. (Lieberman, pp. 5-6) These are not 
new ideas. Privatization has been achieved in 
South America, Mexico and the United States. 
In many, if not all, of these situations, cost sav-
ings is the main objective. In Eastern and 
Central Europe, the objectives of privatization 
included the introduction of a market econo-
my, increased economic efficiency, the estab-
lishment of democracy, and increased govern-
ment revenues. (Dhanji, p. 1) 
Methods of Privatization 
Privatization occurs when a state no 
longer wishes to control an industry. 
Ownership is then transferred to a non-gov-
ernmental owner. The issues to be addressed 
by those conducting the privatization are pres-
ent ownership, future ownership, compensa-
tion to the current owner, and the conse-
quences of the transfer. There were several 
modes of privatization in Eastern and Central 
Europe used to privatize industries. 
Holding companies can be established to 
implement privatization. Properly managed, 
this method can make for an orderly and equi-
table transition. However, there is the risk that 
the holding company may lack the expertise or 
may not act in a conscientious manner. Also, 
internal privatization transfers ownership to 
employees of the company. Finally, external 
privatization gives ownership of the company 
to persons or entities (corporations, etc.) out-
side the enterprise. (Dhanji, pp. 14-24) 
External privatization includes distributing 
shares of a company to all citizens and selling 
shares to domestic, foreign, or institutional 
investors (e.g., banks, stock funds, insurance 
funds, pension funds, and universities). 
All of these modes have been utilized to 
privatize the former communist bloc countries 
with varying degrees of success. Another form 
of internal privatization, politely termed "spon-
taneous privatization," occurs when manage-
ment perceives that government is incapable of 
interfering and assumes control of the compa-
ny, justifying its actions on the grounds that 
those who work the land own the land. For 
example, because many generations passed 
since land in the Soviet Union had been pri-
vately owned, there was no chance that claims 
of prior ownership existed. Also, "land" was 
loosely interpreted to include buildings and 
industry on the land. (Lieberman, p. 21) 
Not waiting for ownership and leadership 
to be assumed by unknown opportunists, 
Germany placed the state-owned enterprises of 
the former East Germany under the control of 
a single holding company, the Treuhandanstalt 
(Treuhand). Treuhand utilized all forms of pri-
vatization- except for spontaneous privatiza-
tion and the outright giveaway-to effectively 
privatize the entire East German economy. 
Treuhandanstalt 
Treuhand came into existence by a resolu-
tion of the Council of Ministers on March 1, 
1990, under the Modrow government of East 
Germany. The original agency was composed of 
15 branch offices and approximately 600 employ-
ees. (Treuhandanstalt: Working ... , pp. 8-9) On 
March 18, 1990, the first freely contested elec-
tion in East Germany took place, which paved 
the way for deMaiziere to become the prime min-
ister. (Darnton, pp. 24-26) On June 17, 1990, 
the East German Parliament under deMaiziere 
passed the Treuhandgesetz, or Trusteeship Act, 
which formally charged Treuhand with the 
responsibility for privatizing East German indus-
try. (Treuhandanstalt: Working ... , pp. 8-9) 
When East Germany and West Germany merged 
on July 1, 1990, and assumed the constitution 
and currency of West Germany, Treuhand was 
commissioned as the official privatizing agency. 
Roughly two-thirds of its members were former 
East German representatives and one-third West 
German representatives. (Treuhandanstalt: 
Promoting ... , p. 5) 
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Purpose 
When first established by East Germany 
on June 17, 1990, Treuhand had four goals. The 
first stipulated removal of government inter-
ference in commerce by reducing the com-
mercial activity of the state as rapidly and exten-
sively as possible through privatization. The 
second established that maintaining existing 
jobs and creating new ones was of paramount 
importance by keeping as many companies as 
possible competitive. The third expanded the 
restructuring of East Germany to include real 
estate, but limited it to commercial use. The 
fourth goal was to grant depositors the legally 
vested right to a share in the state-owned assets 
to offset the unfavorable currency conversion 
rate on June 2, 1990. (Treuhandanstalt: 
Promoting ... , p. 5) It is not clear who "depos-
itors" are, but it is presumed that this was an 
attempt to safeguard against a giveaway of East 
German assets. 
Organization 
When originally established by the now 
defunct East Germany, Treuhand had 200 
employees. At the peak of operation its ranks 
swelled to 4,000 full-time employees plus 400 
full-time consultants, mostly of West German 
origin, distributed among 15 regional offices 
and headquarters in Berlin. During the initial 
stages of organizing and "gearing up," experi-
enced managers from large corporations were 
lent to Treu)1and. These temporary managers, 
who offered considerable expertise, were grad-
ually replaced by newly hired full-time person-
nel. Also on loan were senior tenured bureau-
crats from German governmental agencies. An 
additional group included senior managers 
nearing retirement or retired managers who 
had been persuaded to assist this special cause. 
Attracting younger staff members was not dif-
ficult since the lure of good pay and the oppor-
tunity to make high-level contacts held great 
appeal. (Dodds, pp. 5-12) 
Philosophy 
In 1948 when Ludwig Erhard, an eco-
nomic associate to Prime Minister Adenauer, 
made the bold and controversial decision to end 
wage controls, price controls, and rationing, 
West Germany shifted from a command econ-
omy to a market economy. (Craig, p. 43) Given 
this precedent, it was reasonable to remove the 
command structure as expeditiously as possi-
ble from East Germany in 1990. Treuhand 
attempted to do this and still provide a "soft 
landing" for those people who had been under 
the East German rule for forty years. Dr. Detlev 
Rohwedder, the first director of Treuhand, suc-
cinctly stated the philosophy of Treuhand as 
rapid privatization, resolute restructuring, and 
careful closure. Treuhand felt that an aggres-
sive approach to selling the formerly state-
owned enterprises could be expected. To carry 
out the conversion, Treuhand first assumed 
ownership and control of the entire inventory 
of state-owned enterprises and then disposed of 
them. When unable to sell a business in exist-
ing form or return a company to a prior owner, 
measures were taken to encourage a sale (e.g. , 
restructure to smaller units , offer financial 
incentives, etc.). If still unable to sell the busi-
ness, termination or closure would be con-
ducted prudently. (Treuhandanstalt: Promo-
ting ... , p. 6) 
To conduct the sale of the formerly state-
owned enterprises, Treuhand was guided by cer-
tain principles. For example, Treuhand encour-
aged foreign investment because this would 
reduce the cost that the Germans would have 
to bear. One of the greatest obstacles was the 
resolution of prior claims by either the owners 
or the heirs who made claims to land, busi-
nesses , and non-commercial real estate. 
Treuhand also sought to improve infrastructure 
as quickly as possible. (Treuhandanstalt: the 
Chance ... pp. 4-5) To preserve jobs, Treuhand 
made concessions relative to sale price, tax 
abatements , and environmental cleanup. 
(Dodds , pp. 9-11) Additionally, Treuhand 
addressed the problem that some businesses 
were overstaffed and, despite the commitment 
to save jobs, reductions were needed. To lessen 
the subsequent impact of unemployment, 
Treuhand subsidized wages, often as much as 
90 percent, and also provided benefits for the 
unemployed. (Treuhandanstalt: the Chance ... , 
pp. 5-7) It attempted to retrain workers and 
provide youth with skills by establishing train-
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ing centers in the Eastern states. (Kappler, p. 
413) Treuhand granted flexibility for those pur-
chasing an entire enterprise, individual sub-
sidiaries, or parts of assets by price negotiations 
based on prospective purchasers providing job 
and investment guarantees. (Treuhandanstalt: 
the Chance ... , pp. 12-13) However, it frowned 
upon opportunists who sought quick profits by 
purchasing and then dismantling one of their 
holdings. (Dodds, pp. 23-24) Finally, Treuhand 
encouraged management buyout plans, either 
by existing managers, new managers, or a com-
bination of the two. (Treuhandanstalt: the 
Chance ... , pp. 17-18) 
When evaluating an offer, Treuhand fol-
lowed specific criteria. Job guarantees were 
essential. Treuhand also sought an investor 
with knowledge of the industry, a plan to train 
employees, and a willingness to invest capital 
into the company rather than depend on 
Treuhand for funding. The purchaser also had 
to plan to continue operating the business and 
not dismantle the company by selling off assets 
and land separately. Finally, it was essential for 
the investor to have a strategy that would carry 
for the next three to five years. (Freymark) 
With these reasonable guidelines established, 
Treuhand converted the East German com-
mand economy to a market economy. 
The East German Economy 
When Westerners entered East Germany 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became appar-
ent why the centrally planned, command econ-
omy had failed. Although East Germany was 
reportedly in better shape than other Eastern 
Bloc nations, in general its industries could not 
compete with those in the West. There was lit-
tle demand for inferior Eastern products. 
Furthermore, by artificially setting the value of 
the ost mark and deutschemark at 1:1, Eastern 
prices were non-competitive. (Prior to unifi-
cation the actual rate of exchange of the ost 
mark for the deutsche mark had been approxi-
mately 6:1.) The communists had not invested 
adequately in maintaining and upgrading their 
businesses. Half of the industrial machinery 
was at least ten years old, and 20 percent was at 
least twenty years old. This had happened 
because the government maintained solvency 
by taxing the profits out of the businesses, leav-
ing no money for reinvestment. (Reier, p. 48) 
East German infrastructure also was inad-
equate. Roads were incapable of handling the 
volume of cars and industrial traffic. 
Telecommunication lines and equipment were 
substandard. Environmental damage was so 
severe that it was deemed necessary to phase in 
the stringent standards of the West gradually. 
At the time of unification, 80 percent of elec-
tricity was produced from highly polluting lig-
nite (brown coal). (Treuhandanstalt: the 
Chance ... , pp. 7-8) 
Bitterfield is called by its residents "the 
dirtiest city in Europe," and with good cause. 
It is the center of the East German chemical 
industry. Smokestacks bellow noxious lignite 
smoke everywhere. Respiratory diseases are 
common, and there is a high incidence of can-
cer. The local picnic spot is called "Silver Lake," 
its name derived from its color due to the 
chemicals in it. "Silver Lake" is not the only 
polluted body of water. One third of East 
German rivers are dead. The air is no better; in 
many cities pollution exceeds the safe limit 10 
to 100 times. (Long, pp. 18-21). 
The organization of the former East 
German economy included businesses which 
were large horizontally- or vertically-integrat-
ed Kombinates, state-owned and centrally con-
trolled. Only two percent of the labor force 
were outside the socialized sector and consist-
ed mostly of artisans, farmers and small store 
owners. Prior to the collapse of the East, two-
thirds of foreign trade was with other planned 
economies, such as the Soviet Union. With 
most of its trading partners in collapse, goods 
piled up in storage and employment dropped by 
18 percent. (Kurian, p. 222) 
Treuhand's Activities 
In only four years, Treuhand succeeded in 
converting the entire economic structure of the 
former East Germany from a command econo-
my to a market economy, resulting in revital-
ization and growth in the East. When Treuhand 
began functioning in October 1990, it assumed 
responsibility for over 8,000 combines and 
state-owned enterprises, which represented 97 
percent of all of East German industry. 
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(Treuhandanstalt: Working for ... , p. 8) The 
remaining 3 percent of industry was already pri-
vate industry. The combines were eventually 
separated into smaller units for purposes of pri-
vatization. By the end of 1994, Treuhand had 
privatized approximately 98 percent of compa-
nies, businesses, and industries in the Eastern 
states. In all, 119 large and medium-sized for-
mer state-owned enterprises were closed, and 
3,340 have been, or are in the process of being, 
liquidated as of December 1994, when Treuhand 
ceased to function. (Focus on. .. , p. 2) 
Approximately 14,000 state-owned enter-
prises of the former East Germany were even-
tually privatized (Focus on. .. , p. 2) , including 
facilities given to municipalities and business-
es returned to rightful owners who had been 
victimized by the Nazis and communists sub-
sequent to 1949. (Dodds, pp. 35-36) The latter 
proved to be one of the most challenging and 
difficult problems for privatization and was 
overcome in March 1991 with the Transfer of 
Assets Act, which gave priority to jobs and 
investment over prior claims. In keeping with 
the Treuhand philosophy of rapid, expedient 
action, local authorities could immediately use 
properties, pending final resolution. 
(Treuhandanstalt: Working for ... , p. 15) 
Ultimately, Treuhand took the position that 
investment and jobs were the primary concern. 
Former owners, unwilling or unable to proceed 
under these premises, would be compensated 
for their property by Treuhand. (Treuhandan-
stalt: Promoting the New Germany, p. 9) 
One fifth of the privatizations were man-
agement buyouts, and 92 percent of the busi-
nesses were taken over by Germans, represent-
ing 80 percent of cash investment. (Freymark) 
Foreign investors generally were large, highly 
visible companies, such as Dow Chemical, 
Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Philip Morris, and 
General Motors. As of October 1994, Dow 
Chemical and Gazprom of Russia were prepar-
ing to invest in Buna, a polyolefin plastics man-
ufacturer. ("Company News ... " p. D3) Although 
foreign investment accounted for only 8 per-
cent of the businesses, the cash invested 
accounted for 20 percent of the investment in 
the region. (Freymark) 
In addition to selling businesses, Treuhand 
also sold buildings and land. In East Germany 
much of the social structure had fallen under 
the company umbrella. This included vacation 
time, health care, cultural activities, day care 
and education, housing, etc. (Cohen, p. 1) 
Treuhand transferred administration to the 
community. (Focus on. .. , pp. 2-3) 
When state-owned enterprises were 
unsaleable, Treuhand restructured them and 
invested the necessary capital to increase their 
attractiveness to buyers and make them 
saleable. (Focus on. .. , pp. 2-3) One notable 
example was Eko Stahl AG in Eisenhuttenstadt, 
the largest steel producer in the Eastern states. 
The Treuhand agency invested DM 500 million 
($318.5 million) during four years of efforts to 
privatize Eko Stahl. This included the building 
of a continuous-casting hot-rolling mill. 
(Cohen, p. D1) By so doing, Eko Stahl person-
nel director Peter Neumann predicted steel 
could be produced at 80 percent of the cost of 
other steel producers. Treuhand's efforts were 
successful, and Eko Stahl was sold to Cockerill 
Sambre S.A. shortly before Treuhand's mandate 
expired. (Penson, p. 46) 
Privatization contracts included guaran-
tees of employment by contractual promises to 
hire or keep existing employees, totaling 1.5 
million jobs. Integral to many contracts were 
guarantees of capital investment, totaling DM 
180 billion. (Focus on. .. , p. 2) 
Treuhand sought to obtain true market 
value for each venture, but market value was 
sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to assess. 
The conversion to deutschemarks at 1:1 or 1:2 
for ost marks heavily favored those in a cash 
position, since the conversion on the open mar-
ket prior to the unification was one deutsche 
mark for six ost marks. Those in a cash posi-
tion tripled their cash. Those with debt tripled 
their debt. In former East Germany, the gov-
ernment shifted its debt onto individual firms. 
Thus, the books of these companies sometimes 
showed considerable debt owed to state-owned 
banks of the former East Germany. It then 
became the responsibility of the successor 
agency to refinance this debt. (Dodds, p. 19) In 
order to make these companies attractive to 
buyers, price concessions were given in 
exchange for job guarantees and/or promises to 
invest capital. Other incentives included tax 
abatements and wage subsidies. Treuhand rec-
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ognized that some companies were overstaffed 
and were sympathetic to both prospective buy-
ers and the staff about to be let go. Often, 
Treuhand authorized the state to pay up to 90 
percent of part-time and unemployed workers' 
salaries. The cost of environmental clean-up 
was sometimes shared by Treuhand. 
(Treuhandanstalt: the Chance ... , p. 7) If 
detoxification costs were prohibitive, Treuhand 
supported moving the operation to a "green 
field" site. The long term objective was to cre-
ate a strong economy. (Dodds, p. 11) 
Through its activities, Treuhand experi-
enced failure as well as success. And in the 
cases presented below, I will show how the pri-
vatization of a trucking company resulted in 
closure, while a compact disk manufacturer 
experienced a fresh start and a refrigerator 
manufacturer was saved. 
Pilz the Trucker: A Case for 
Closure 
After fifty years of "milking" an industry, 
it is not always possible to resurrect it. Such 
was the case with Transmercur GmbH, a truck-
ing company with headquarters in Leipzig. 
After Treuhand took over, Eberhard Pilz was 
asked to head up Transmercur and "find a 
· Western partner." He had previously been tech-
nical director of the predecessor organization, 
VEB Handelstransport, but refused to assume 
the role of director. Pilz and Treuhand inher-
ited a fleet of 700 trucks, most of which were 
more than 14 years old with no spare parts 
available. (Glouchevitch, pp. 190-91) 
As a manager under East German control, 
Pilz said that management had little power or 
control. Under the socialist system, the work-
ing man and working woman were very impor-
tant. Therefore, the party heads were essential 
in the workers' movement. This left the man-
ager in the middle, responsible for meeting pro-
duction goals but lacking power to discipline 
unproductive employees or implement changes. 
Realizing this, employees shunned positions of 
responsibility. (Glouchevitch, p. 192) 
Beyond the aging trucks, Pilz had other 
problems. Because of the possibility of prior 
claims, Transmercur had no clear claim to the 
land on which its offices and depots were built. 
With no collateral, Pilz was unable to secure 
financing for a management buyout. 
Additionally, with the increasing demand for 
West German goods, Western supermarket 
chains quickly opened up in the East and used 
their own trucking companies rather than local 
delivery services. Pilz was unable to export local 
products because there was no demand, and the 
currency revaluation overpriced local goods. 
Furthermore, Pilz was required to comply with 
West German law. For example, fresh produce 
had to be stored and shipped refrigerated to 
safeguard against spoilage. He leased 40 refrig-
erated trucks and built a refrigerated storage 
depot, but still was unable to succeed. 
(Glouchevitch, p. 193) 
The sad story here was not that of Mr. Pilz; 
he had a good reputation and had already 
refused lucrative offers out of loyalty to 
Transmercur. The tragedy was that 600 of 1,000 
workers had already been laid off, and the com-
pany would probably be closed in the near 
future . (Glouchevitch, p. 194). 
Since Treuhand was not in the business of 
simply giving away businesses, a reasonable 
evaluation of its value had to be placed on 
Transmercur before privatizing. As with most 
state-owned enterprises in a socialist economy, 
Transmercur was locally managed, with no 
authority. The state made all decisions and allo-
cations. Further, the state often shifted deficits 
to the company to make the government appear 
solvent and the company inefficient. 
(Glouchevitch, p. 194) The bookkeeping sys-
tem was a charade. 
There had not been clear title to the land 
and the 14-year-old trucks were fully depreci-
ated. This left Transmercur with no tangible 
assets , questionable accounts, an aggressive 
new manager, and a payroll of 1,000 employees. 
As Pilz had pointed out: "We should have wiped 
out all the companies and started from 
scratch .... " Of course, had this been done with-
out first attempting to salvage Transmercur, 
1,000 workers would have accused Treuhand of 
being insensitive, uncaring, and too quick to 
close the business. (Glouchevitch, p. 194) 
The Transmercur example illustrates some 
of the obstacles and criticisms faced by 
Treuhand. The obstacles included lack of accu-
rate financial data, the possible claims of pre-
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war owners, remote and uninvolved manage-
ment, and environmental contamination far 
worse than had been anticipated (Glouchevitch, 
p. 189). Numerous criticisms included demands 
for job creation and retraining programs, addi-
tional incentives for potential investors, and 
ceasing the continual closure of factories. 
(Ardagh, 1991, p. 433) 
There are alternative explanations for this 
unsuccessful privatization. The arrival of West 
Germans created tensions in the East. The 
West German citizens arrived in large numbers, 
flaunting, as some alleged, their knowledge and 
skills. Although it was acknowledged that the 
East embraced the constitution, laws and eco-
nomics of the West, East Germans felt that 
everything was happening too fast and that they 
had been made to feel inferior. In all likelihood, 
this was unavoidable since the Westerners did 
understand the Western laws and the Western 
economy better than the East Germans. On the 
other hand, the West Germans were irked by 
what they perceived as the slowness and lazi-
ness of the East Germans. As a result of work-
ing in a structure where supplies were erratic 
and shortages common, the East Germans were 
not accustomed to working at the Western pace. 
(Ardagh, 1991, pp. 447-48) 
Pilz the Compact Disc 
Manufacturer: A Fresh Start 
An example of the setting up of a success-
ful business is that of Reiner Pilz , an East 
German compact disc manufacturer, who 
migrated to the West and became prosperous. 
He sought to return to his homeland and build 
a factory in the town of Suhl, in a joint venture 
with Robotron VEB, an East German computer 
and office equipment manufacturer. Suhl is a 
quiet town in the forested Thtiringen hills with 
a minimal tourist business. Some industry 
exists there, most notably a shotgun manufac-
turer. Incredibly, the town vetoed Pilz 's busi-
ness proposition on the grounds that the pro-
posed site was too close to a rifle range used to 
train Olympic athletes. (Glouchevitch, p. 195) 
However, Bruno Endter, mayor of 
Albrechts bei Suhl, a village of 1,000 people five 
miles away, saw the opportunity to create 300 
new jobs. He contacted a Robotron executive 
and a deal was struck. Pilz was able to realize 
his dream of returning to East Germany, and 
the East Germans gained 300 badly needed 
jobs. (Glouchevitch, pp. 195-9S) The mindset 
of the people of Suhl was so far removed from 
the dynamics of a market economy that it 
becomes apparent that some people are unem-
ployable as long as they seem to be content try-
ing to feed their families with the medals of 
their rifle team. Fortunately, however, at least 
some East Germans were able to see beyond the 
Thtiringen trees and consider the whole forest. 
Operation Bootstrap: Building a 
Better Refrigerator 
A third case involves Foron, a former East 
German refrigerator manufacturer which was 
given another chance. Like Transmercur and 
many other Eastern companies, Foron was suf-
fering from outdated technology. Treuhand 
had judged Foron to be unsalvageable and 
decided to close it. However, Foron had been 
working on producing a refrigerator free of 
atmosphere-damaging fluorocarbons. Treu-
hand therefore invested $3.4 million in Foron, 
and it was privatized in late 1992 in a joint ven-
ture with a London-based fund , the East 
German Investment Trust, which purchased 4 7 
percent of the company. West Germans, Berlin 
Kapital-Management GmbH., bought 26 per-
cent of Foron. The remaining 27 percent was 
purchased by four Foron managers. 
(Protzman, 1994, p. 01) 
Monetary and Social Costs 
The costs of privatizing the former East 
Germany were high. The net cost was DM 270 
billion ($174.3 billion). Expenditures totaled 
OM 344 billion ($222 billion) and included debt 
payoffs of the former state-owned enterprises, 
environmental cleanup, subsidies, and unem-
ployment benefits, with debt payoffs and subsi-
dies being the largest components. Treuhand 
collected OM 74 billion ($47.7 billion) in rev-
enues. Anticipated costs of OM 69 billion ($3S.2 
billion) to finance successor agencies are also 
included in these figures. (Focus on. .. , p. 4) 
The impact of these costs on the West 
German states has been enormous. Taxes in 
1S 
Germany have already increased ten times 
between 1993 and July 1995 (Shales, p. AS), and 
provisions have been made to amortize the cost 
over the next thirty years. (Kappler, p. 233) In 
1990 East German consumption resulted in a 
boom in the economy. (Glouchevitch, pp. 1SS-
S9) However, a year later, the economy was fal-
tering. The government raised taxes to help 
finance the cost of reunification and the infla-
tion rate increased. ("Will Germany's Boom ... " 
p. 73) By the end of 1994, inflation was 4.2 per-
cent. ("German Inflation Up," p. 04) 
Taxes and inflation were not the only prob-
lems. Unemployment also rose. As industries 
in the former East Germany were privatized, 
the work force decreased. The overall unem-
ployment rate for Germany at the end of 1994 
stood at 9.6 percent, the highest in forty-five 
years. (Whitney, 1994, p. A3) In August 1995, 
it was reported in the Wall Street Journal that 
as a result of a very strong mark and the high-
est wage costs in the world, companies such as 
Volkswagen AG and Daimler Benz Aerospace 
AG have been attempting to reduce their labor 
costs , resulting in higher unemployment. 
(Marshall, "Jobless ... " p. AS) Unyielding unions 
have negotiated wage increases higher than the 
inflation rate. (Marshall , "International: 
Germany Sees ... ", p. A10) Another observer 
states that the unemployment rate appears to 
be "leveling off," but feels that many of the 
unemployed Eastern Germans may never be re-
employed. (Shlaes, p. AS) 
Criticisms of Treuhand 
There has been no dearth of criticism of 
reunification. For example, Treuhand has been 
accused of being too eager to finish the task and 
of restructuring companies inadequately. 
(Balasubramanyam, p. S3) However, other 
Germans felt the process was too slow and that 
the guidelines were vague. Some claimed 
Treuhand tried too hard to save unsalvageable 
businesses (Glouchevitch, pp. 1S9-94) and 
worked too extensively to sustain "obsolete" 
companies, but was also too quick to close busi-
nesses. ("Hand of Kindness ... " p. 71) Some 
alleged Treuhand privatized with inexperienced 
staff who allowed ruthless entrepreneurs to 
seize unbelievable bargains in East Germany. 
(Glouchevitch, p. 189) There was also some 
sentiment that Treuhand attracted little foreign 
investment and that tax increases were required 
because of the overly generous unemployment 
policies of the East. (Balasubramanyam, p. 83) 
However insignificant some of these criticisms 
may appear in retrospect, emotions became 
very intense, so much so that the director of 
Treuhand, Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, was 
assassinated in his home on April 1, 1991. 
(McAdams, pp. 219-20) Rohwedder's deputy, 
Brigit Breuel, succeeded him and remained 
director until privatization was completed. 
(Treuhandanstalt: Working ... , p. 31) 
Privatization After Treuhand 
As Treuhand was preparing to close its 
doors, privatization without Treuhand was gain-
ing momentum in Germany. The German 
Parliament (Bundestag) has approved plans to 
privatize the postal service, Lufthansa Airlines, 
and Deutsche Telekom. ("German Privatization 
Plan," p. D5) On September 13, 1994, Lufthansa 
announced that 65 percent of its stock would 
be offered to private investors. A second offer-
ing would later fully privatize the airline. 
("Lufthansa to Sell Shares," p. D18) In October 
1994, Goldman Sachs began offering shares of 
Deutsche Telekom, the state telephone monop-
oly. (Nash, p. A4) As with Lufthansa, Deutsche 
Telecom was not profitable, and the Bundestag 
was hoping to save money and to improve the 
efficiency of both industries. 
Conclusion 
Treuhand has been described as "born out 
of chaos, and destined to be phased out without 
ever functioning normally. " (Dodds, 7) 
However, Treuhand functioned in a manner 
consistent with the basic Rohwedder philoso-
phy: rapidly privatize; preserve jobs as much as 
possible; protect human and property rights; 
encourage investment of capital, both domes-
tic and foreign; establish educational programs; 
and generate conditions that would permit the 
Eastern states to work toward attaining eco-
nomic parity with the West. As there was little 
to start with, virtually the entire industry of the 
former East Germany has been, or is in the 
19 
process of being, rebuilt. Mr. Pilz, the trucker, 
retrospectively concluded that Transmercur 
should have been shut down. Perhaps he was 
correct. However, had this kind of thinking 
become pervasive, Eko Stahl and Foron would 
also have been closed. Although criticisms had 
merit in specific instances, overall Treuhand 
certainly succeeded. No doubt many jobs were 
lost, but there really was not enough work to 
justify the large labor force. To ease the transi-
tion, generous unemployment benefits and 
opportunities for retraining were provided. In 
addition, the sentiments of the townspeople of 
Suhl, who valued the sanctity of their Olympic 
rifle range more highly than the opportunity to 
create 300 new jobs, must not be forgotten. 
Treuhand has readily admitted that some 
mistakes were made. There was alleged dis-
honesty on the part of some Treuhand employ-
ees. Political pressure was exerted, and occa-
sionally controls were inadequate. Especially 
in the early days of privatization, Western entre-
preneurs practiced some "spontaneous privati-
zation," unbeknownst to Treuhand. (Dodds, p. 
17) However, as of January 1995, only six cases 
of fraud were in litigation out of a total of 
approximately 14,000 privatized companies. 
(Focus on ... , pp. 5-6) 
There is general agreement that the cost 
of privatization to taxpayers was high. However, 
given the prevalent socialistic philosophy, it was 
inconceivable that some German citizens 
should receive less social assistance than oth-
ers. Many West Germans felt the East Germans 
were receiving too much aid, with the West pay-
ing the price and receiving nothing in return. 
The additional funds needed were generated by 
tax increases and issuance of bonds, which 
permitted the costs to be amortized over a 30 
year period. 
It appears that Treuhand did in fact per-
form the task with which it was charged. It pri-
vatized or closed well in excess of 90 percent of 
the state-owned enterprises of the former East 
Germany, assisted in creating an infrastructure 
to support these privatized industries, and was 
successful in creating new jobs. Training facil-
ities were established to train young workers 
and retrain older workers. Capital, both West 
German and foreign, is flowing into the region. 
True to its word, Treuhand stopped operating 
on December 31, 1994, allaying fears that it 
would become another layer of bureaucracy, 
resembling the socialist structure it was creat-
ed to dismantle. 
However, there has been great discontent 
among the unemployed. Unwilling to com-
prehend that the totalitarian state was bank-
rupt, many have placed the blame for unem-
ployment on Treuhand and the West. For these 
malcontents there is no answer. It is unfortu-
nate that those who have suffered may never 
see the successes. 
The prospects for Germany's future are 
bright. With the declining birth rate in the 
East, the potential work force is growing less 
rapidly or even declining; this will eventually 
lower the unemployment rate. As Eastern 
industry continues to grow, it is probable that 
workers will begin to migrate to the former 
East Germany, seeking job opportunities and 
homes close to work. Despite the present dis-
content, high unemployment, and high nation-
al debt, the future looks very promising for 
Germany, in particular the East. With outdat-
ed technology replaced, the Eastern states may 
in time even surpass the Western states eco-
nomically. (Freymark) 
Treuhand has written another chapter for 
future economics textbooks. Never before has 
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the economy of a modern nation been changed 
so dramatically in a planned and peaceful man-
ner. As economic efficiency is sought through 
privatization, it makes sense to evaluate 
Treuhand's achievements and relevance to 
other situations, notably the remainder of the 
Communist Bloc. With East Germany recon-
structed, there is the opportunity to assist in 
the reconstruction of the rest of the former 
Communist Bloc, as the unified Germany has 
the expertise, experience, and Eastern Bloc con-
tacts. (Freymark) 
Privatization occurs in both market 
economies and command economies. In both 
types of systems, the goals are the same - cost 
savings and enhanced efficiency. The effect of 
privatizing is to remove a layer of bureaucracy, 
bringing management closer to production. 
Further, as the industry is removed from the 
protective umbrella of the state, it becomes more 
subject to forces of the market economy. Thus, 
the state-owned enterprise always functions in 
a command economy. Then privatization, 
whether in a command economy or a market 
economy, is always a shift to a market economy. 
However, for privatization to be worthwhile it 
must be cost-effective and must include costs of 
social services to catch the casualties. 
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